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Abstract. This paper describes a framework currently under develop-
ment for modelling, simulation, and verification of relay interlocking sys-
tems as used by the Danish railways. The framework is centred around
a domain-specific language (DSL) for describing such systems, and pro-
vides (1) a graphical editor for creating DSL descriptions, (2) a valida-
tor for checking that DSL descriptions are statically well-formed, (3) a
graphical simulator for simulating the dynamic behaviour of relay inter-
locking systems, and (4) verification support for deriving and verifying
safety properties of relay interlocking systems. The paper also touches
upon how such a framework can be developed using the RAISE Formal
Method.
1 Introduction
In this paper we describe the visions of an ongoing project made in collaboration
with Banedanmark.
Background and motivation A conventional means of keeping the railway traffic
safe is to use interlocking systems that control signals and points in such a
way that trains are only allowed to pass a signal when this cannot lead to train
collisions or derailments. Many Danish interlocking systems are still implemented
using complex electrical circuits containing relays. These relay based interlocking
systems are documented by diagrams of the electrical circuits, and currently
the only way to analyse them is to inspect the diagrams and manually draw
conclusions. This is very difficult to do as the number of diagrams for a single
system is very high and the logic described in each of them is complicated with
many mutual dependencies. Certainly such a manual analysis is not only difficult
and time consuming, but may also be error prone. This is not satisfactory for
a safety-critical system. To help this, we started a project, the goal of which
is to formalise and automate the validation and verification process for relay
interlocking systems.
Solution approach Our solution to the above mentioned problem is to provide a
framework of computer-based tools that support the validation and verification
process. The tools should be centred around a domain-specific language for ex-
pressing the documentation that is usually made for relay interlocking systems,
e.g. track layout and relay circuit diagrams. The idea is that to analyse or verify
a relay interlocking system the railway engineer should express the documenta-
tion of the relay interlocking system in this domain-specific language, and the
framework should provide tools that can be applied to such documentation to
analyse and verify the documented relay interlocking system. Prototypes of such
tools have already been developed. We have chosen to centre the tools around
a domain-specific language rather than a general purpose modelling language,
as it is easier for railway engineers to use a language that facilitates concepts
already known and used in the railway domain.
Related work The author and Jan Peleska have developed a framework of tools
for the construction and verification of tramway control systems [8]. These tools
are also centred around a domain-specific language, however the language and
tools are different from those described in this paper. The differences are due
to the fact that the controllers in that work are electronic, while ours are im-
plemented using relay circuits. For instance, the tool set described in this paper
provides a simulator for the electrical behaviour of relay circuits (which is not rel-
evant for electronic systems) while the other tool set provides a control software
generator (which is not relevant for relay systems).
For other complementary and competing approaches for the development
and verification of railway control systems the reader is e.g. referred to the
contributions in [11], and for a survey of results and trends the reader is referred
to the paper [2].
Paper overview First, in Section 2, we describe the railway application domain.
Then, in Section 3, we give an overview of the tools framework, and in the
subsequent sections we describe the domain-specific language and each of the
tool components in more detail. Finally in section 8 we touch upon how such a
framework can be formally developed using the RAISE Formal Method [10].
2 The railway application domain
In this section we introduce concepts of the railway domain that are relevant for
this paper.
2.1 Equipment at a station
The considered interlocking systems use various track-side equipment to monitor
and control trains:
Track circuits: The railway tracks are divided into sections each having equip-
ment (a circuit) for train detection. The interlocking system uses this for
monitoring the occupancy status of the individual track sections.
Points: Tracks are joined at points which can guide trains into different direc-
tions depending on the position of the point. An operator can switch the
points by pushing some buttons. The interlocking system monitors and
controls the positions of points.
Signals: Signals are placed at the entrance of some track sections. They can
show GO and STOP aspects. The interlocking system sets the signals to
inform the train drivers whether they are allowed to enter these sections.
Figure 1 illustrates the interactions between the operator, the interlocking sys-
tem, the trains, and the track side equipment.
Fig. 1. Relationships between different elements of a station.
2.2 Train routes and train route tables
The stations we are considering in this paper use a route based approach to
interlocking. The basic ideas of this approach are:
– Trains should drive on routes through the network.
– Each route is covered by an entrance signal that informs whether it is allowed
for a train to enter the route or not. The trains must respect the signals.
– Two trains must never be allowed to drive on conflicting (i.e. overlapping)
routes at the same time. (To prevent collisions.)
– Before a train is allowed to enter a route, the points must be locked in
positions making the route connected (i.e. it is physically possible to go
from one end of the route to the other end without derailing), and the route
must be empty (i.e. there are no trains on the route). (To prevent derailing
and collisions, respectively.)
– The points of a route must not be switched while a train is driving on the
route. (To prevent derailing.)
For each station to be controlled by an interlocking system, a train route table is
used to specify routes and interlocking rules for that station. Such tables define
for each train route
– which settings of signals are required for the route to be open (i.e. for allowing
trains to enter the route),
– which positions points must have for the route to be connected,
– which track sections must be unoccupied for the route to be empty, and
– the conditions for unlocking/freeing a route.
The tables also define which train routes are conflicting.
2.3 Relay circuits
The interlocking systems we are considering are implemented by electrical relay
circuits. In [6] a formal domain-model for relay circuits is presented. Here we
just give an informal description.
A relay circuit is made up of components such as power supplies, relays,
contacts, and buttons, connected by wires. A relay is an electrical switch oper-
ated by an electromagnet to connect or disconnect a number of contacts in a
circuit. When current goes through the relay, the magnet is drawn and some of
the associated contacts are connected (these contacts are said to be upper con-
tacts) while others (the lower contacts) are disconnected. When no current goes
through the relay, the magnet is dropped and the associated upper and lower
contacts will be disconnected and connected, respectively. When contacts are
connected/disconnected this may imply that sub-circuits containing these con-
tacts become live/dead. This again may imply that relays of these sub-circuits
are drawn or dropped, and so on.
The system can get input from the environment:
– buttons can be pushed (and later released) by an operator
– for each track section there is a (track) relay that is dropped/drawn when a
train enters/leaves that track section
– for each point there is a (point) relay that is dropped/drawn when that point
is moved into a new position
2.4 Relay circuit diagrams
The Danish railways use diagrams to document the electrical circuits of a relay
system.
For each internal relay one of the diagrams shows the sub-circuit that controls
that relay. An example of such a diagram is shown in Figure 2. This diagram
shows the sub-circuit controlling a relay named RR1. The circuit consists of
a number of components connected by wires. The wires are depicted as black
lines. At the top is the positive pole and at the bottom is the negative pole of
the power supply. Relay RR1 is shown using this signature:
 
 
 



RR1
The downwards arrow informs that in the initial state this relay is dropped. (If
it had been drawn the arrow would have been upwards.) A number of contacts
Fig. 2. Diagram for circuit controlling relay RR1.
belonging to other relays occur in this circuit. E.g. a contact belonging to a relay
named A1 is shown using this signature:
A1
The downwards arrow informs that in the initial state relay A1 is dropped. The
horizontal bar breaks the wire – this indicates that the contact is disconnected
in the initial state. If it had not been breaking the wire it would have indicated
that the contact had been connected in the initial state. Also a button B1 is
shown on the diagram using this signature:
B1
A pushed button is shown by this signature:
B1
3 Framework overview
As mentioned in the introduction our goal is to provide a framework of tools
for analysing and verifying relay interlocking systems. In this section we give an
overview of this framework.
To make the framework user friendly for railway engineers we exploit the
idea to define and centre the tools around a domain-specific language, DSL, for
expressing the documentation that is usually made for the relay interlocking
system of a station. The tools we are developing comprise:
– a (graphical) editor for creating DSL descriptions
– a validator for checking that a DSL description follows static (structural)
rules of the domain
– a (graphical) simulator that for a given DSL description can simulate the
dynamic behaviour of the described interlocking system
generators
editor
environment 
             model model
safety conditions
 station documentation in DSL
validator checking result
model checker
checking result
interlocking system
simulator simulation
Fig. 3. Framework of tools.
– generators that from a DSL description produce input to a model checker:
• a behavioural model of the described interlocking system
• a behavioural model of the described environment (track isolations, points,
and signals)
• safety conditions
A model checker can then be applied to this to verify that the interlocking
system always satisfies the safety conditions.
Figure 3 illustrates this framework of tools. The language and tools will be
further described in the next sections.
4 Domain-specific language
A specification D in DSL consists of the following station documentation:
– a track layout diagram describing the physical environment
– a train route table describing the interlocking rules
– relay circuit diagrams describing the physical implementation
In Figures 4 and 5 are shown the track layout diagram and the train route table
for Stenstrup station (unfortunately in Danish). A detailed explanation of how
to read such a table in given in [3]. The circuit diagrams for Stenstrup are too
large to show in this paper.
Fig. 4. Track layout for Stenstrup station.
A graphical editor for creating relay circuit diagrams and track layout dia-
grams has been implemented, see [5], while an editor for train route tables still
has to be implemented.
Fig. 5. Train route table for Stenstrup station.
5 Validation
The validator tool can be used to check that the station documents are statically
well-formed, e.g. that
1. the track layout diagram represents a legal railway network of track elements
2. the circuit diagrams represent a legal network of circuits
3. the train route table
(a) refers only to track elements in the track layout diagram
(b) describes only routes that are connected paths in the railway network in
the track layout diagram
(c) marks overlapping routes as being conflicting
(d) ...
6 Simulation
When relay diagrams for an interlocking system have been created by the editor
and validated by the validator, the simulator can be used to visualise on these
diagrams how the states of the relay circuits change over time. In this visualisa-
tion one can see the state of wires (current carrying or not), the state of relays
(drawn or dropped), the state of contacts (connected or disconnected), and the
state of buttons (pushed or released).
The user can give input to the system by playing:
1. an operator that pushes a button of the relay circuits
2. a a train that enters or leaves a track section shown in the track layout
diagram
After having given an input the user can step through the sequence of states
that the relay circuits will go through after such an input.
In Figure 6 is given an example of a simulation showing how the state of a
circuit changes when a button is pushed. Wires that are current carrying are
shown by a green colour (seen as a grey colour in black&white print). State 0
is the initial state. In the initial state, no wires are current carrying. When the
button is pushed, current is going from plus to minus through relay 37, see state
State 3State 2
State 1State 0 : initial state
Fig. 6. A state sequence for a circuit.
1. As a consequence of this, relay 37 is drawn and its associated upper contact
becomes connected, opening a second path of current from plus to minus through
relay 33, see state 2. As current is going through relay 33, this will be drawn,
see state 3. In state 3 no more internal events can happen.
A detailed description of the simulator tool and its development is given
in [5].
7 Verification
This section describes how our framework provides verification support for a
relay interlocking system.
of interlocking system
of environment
safety conditions
   behavioural model resultsstation documentation
model check
   behavioural model
Fig. 7. Verification in two steps.
When the station documentation for the interlocking system has been created
in the domain-specific language and validated by the validator, verification can
be performed in two steps as illustrated in Figure 7. First generators are applied
to automatically generate input to a model checker:
– a behavioural model Mc of the relay control system,
– a behavioural model Me of the environment (signals, points, and track iso-
lations), and
– safety conditions φ.
and then the model checker is applied to check that the concurrent composition
of the models Mc and Me always satisfies the safety conditions φ.
We have chosen model checking as the verification approach as this allows for
full automation. As model checker tool we have chosen to use the SAL model
checker [1]. The behavioural models are state transition system models and the
safety conditions are assertions in the temporal logic LTL expressed in the SAL
Language [4].
Details of this work is described in [7, 3].
8 Development of a domain-specific language and tools
We are using the RAISE Specification Language, RSL, [9] to specify the domain-
specific language and most of the tools. Examples of this can be found in [7, 3].
As implementation language we are using Java.
The specifications are typically developed starting with a property-oriented
specification and ending with an executable specification. Some of the advantages
of this are:
– It is easier first to make an abstract specification in which e.g. only the prop-
erties of functions are given, and then later make an executable specification
in which algorithms for the functions are given.
– It is easier to define data types and algorithms in an RSL executable speci-
fication and then translate these into Java, than coding directly in Java.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have given an overview of a tool set that is intended to help
railway engineers to analyse and verify relay interlocking systems. To describe
a system to be analysed or verified, the railway engineer just has to use an
editor for a domain-specific language to create documents that railway engineers
are already used to create: track layout diagrams, train route tables, and relay
circuits. The tool set includes a validator, a simulator, and model and safety
condition generators that all take such documents as input. The validator can
be used to check that the created documents follow the rules of the domain.
The simulator can be used to validate that the electrical circuits behave as
expected. The model and safety condition generators can be used to generate
input to a model checker that then can be used to automatically verify that
the described relay interlocking system is safe. To use such automated tools is a
great improvement compared to manual inspections of diagrams: it is faster and
easier to do, and it reduces the risk that errors or omissions are made.
Prototypes of most of the tools have been implemented, while a few of them
are currently under development. In future work we plan also to experiment with
other editors, visualisations, and model checking approaches to see what is most
valuable and most efficient.
The framework has successfully been applied to verify that Stenstrup station
in Denmark is safe. In future work it should be tested whether the framework
can be applied to large stations without problems such as state space explosion
during model checking.
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